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This article addresses significant developments in Virginia law
pertaining to air and water pollution, solid and hazardous waste,
and pesticide regulation which have occurred between the publica-
tion of last year's survey' and August 1, 1989. Not considered
herein are the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area Designation and





The 1989 General Assembly passed legislation providing that in-
spection waivers, available to motor vehicles which fail emissions
inspections under the inspection and maintenance ("I & M") pro-
gram applicable to Northern Virginia, are valid for a maximum of
two years.3 Previously, such waivers were valid for two years, or
until the vehicle was sold or traded, whichever period was longer.4
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the Pacific; M.A., 1983, Emory University; J.D., 1986, Tulane University. Michael J. Grat-
ton, III, Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary, class of 1990
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1. Natural Resources Section, Office of the Attorney General, Environmental Law: An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RicH. L. REv. 587 (1988) [hereinafter Environmental
Law]. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Natural Resources Section at-
torneys John R. Butcher, Deborah Love Feild and J. Steven Sheppard, III, who without
benefit of reviewing the manuscript, discussed several aspects of this article with the author
on August 17, 1989, and provided copies of unreported circuit court decisions.
2. 6:1 Va. Regs. Reg. 11 (1989).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1181 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
4. Id. § 46.1-326.7 (Cum. Supp. 1988).




The State Air Pollution Control Board (the "Board"), pursuant
to its delegated authority from the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)5 to implement and enforce the Clean Air
Act's New Source Performance Standards6 (NSPS) and National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS) in
Virginia,7 published Revision Six to its Regulations for the Control
and Abatement of Air Pollution. Revision Six incorporated by ref-
erence the federal regulatory amendments updating both NSPS
and NESHAPS.8 Further updates to the list of NSPS and
NESHAPS were proposed by the Board on July 3, 1989.1
On July 17, 1989, the Board published notices of intended regu-
latory action which could have a significant impact on existing
sources. The Board intends to consider amending its non-criteria
pollutant regulations. 10 Non-criteria pollutants are generally those
pollutants for which no National Ambient Air Quality Standard
("NAAQS") has been set pursuant to the Clean Air Act." Virginia
has had a comprehensive non-criteria pollutant regulatory program
in place since 1985.12 The Board is also considering whether to re-
quire registered, but unpermitted, "grandfathered" sources to ob-
tain operating permits.'3
5. 46 Fed. Reg. 43,300 (1981).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 60 (1988).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 61 (1988).
8. 5:3 Va. Regs. Reg. 336 (1988).
9. 5:20 Va. Regs. Reg. 2785 (1989), corrected at 5:22 Va. Regs. Reg. 3356 (1989).
10. 5:21 Va. Regs. Reg. 3172 (1989).
11. STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, REGULATIONS FOR
THE CONTROL AND ABATEMENT OF AIR POLLUTION, § 120-04-0300 (1986).
12. See Id. § 120-04-0303 (1986) (Full text of Regulations for the Control and Abatement
of Air Pollution are available to the public through the offices of the Registrar of Regula-
tions and the State Air Pollution Control Board).
13. 5:21 Va. Regs. Reg. 3173 (1989); 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). Only new, modified, recon-
structed or existing sources which emit hazardous air pollutants are required to obtain per-





Pursuant to the 1988 General Assembly's changes in Northern
Virginia's I & M program,14 the Board promulgated its Regulation
for the Control of Motor Vehicle Emissions, 15 which is applicable
to owners of motor vehicles registered in Northern Virginia.", The
rules set exhaust emission standards for carbon monoxide ("CO")
and hydrocarbons ("HC") for model years between 1968-69, (8%
CO; 800 ppm HC) and 1970-74 (6% CO; 600 ppm HC). 7 The rules
prohibit the operation of post-1973 motor vehicles, unless they are
equipped with an emission control system or device.' 8 Further, the
rules prohibit the operation of any motor vehicle if its emissions
control system or device has been defeated or replaced by non-
standard factory replacement parts or a part that is not certified
by the EPA.'9 The regulation also contains rules pertaining to
emissions station licensing, operating procedures, and emissions in-
spection procedures.20 Because the Board did not adopt rules per-
taining to emissions mechanics and inspector licensing, the rele-
vant state police regulations remain in effect.2 ' The Board also
promulgated its Regulation for Vehicle Emission Control Program
Analyzer Systems, which applies to all equipment and instruments
used to measure exhaust emissions pursuant to the Vehicle Emis-
sions Control Program.22
In the spring of 1989, the EPA published its final regulations
designed to achieve seasonal reductions in volatile organic com-
pound ("VOC") emissions from evaporating gasoline in motor ve-
hicles.23 The new federal regulations provide that during the regu-
latory control period, only gasoline with a Reid Vapor Pressure
("RVP") of 10.5 pounds per square inch or less be sold.24 The
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-326.2 to -326.14 (Cum. Supp. 1988) (repealed 1989). A current
version of these sections was enacted by the 1989 General Assembly. Id. § 46.2-1181 to 1187
(Repl. Vol. 1989). The program is designed to bring Northern Virginia into compliance with
the National Ambient Air Quality Standard ("NAAQS") for ozone. See id. § 46.2-1182.
15. 5:4 Va. Regs. Reg. 537 (1988).
16. The applicable counties are Arlington, Fairfax and Prince William. The applicable
cities are Alexandria, Fairfax, Falls Church, Manassas and Manassas Park. Id. at 541, § 2.1.
17. Id. at 544, § 3.1.
18. Id. at 544, § 3.2(A).
19. Id. at 544, § 3.2(B).
20. Id. at 544-47, §§ 4.1 to .7.
21. Id. at 547, pt. V.
22. 5:4 Va. Regs. Reg. 557 (1988).
23. 54 Fed. Reg. 11,868 (1989).
24. Id. at 11,883. The regulatory control period begins as early as May 1, for facilities
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Board published a notice of intent to reduce ozone producing
evaporative VOC emissions by limiting gasoline RVP during the
ozone season.25 Although the Clean Air Act prohibits states from
adopting more stringent fuel regulation controls than the EPA has
prescribed,26 a number of eastern states have either proposed or
adopted RVP limits lower than the new federal standards.2' The
promulgation of these more stringent state standards must be con-
sistent with the applicable plan, or pursuant to waiver.2" It is likely
that the Board will consider adopting a lower RVP standard.
2. Administrative Hearings
On June 9, 1989, the Board conducted a formal administrative
hearing on a petition by Avtex Fibers Front Royal, Inc., that car-
bon disulfide ("CS2") emissions at the Avtex plant in Front Royal,
Virginia, produce no endangerment to human health.29 Pursuant to
section 313 of the Emergency Planning Community Right to Know
Act of 1986,30 Avtex reported nearly 25,000 tons of CS2 air emis-
sions for 1987. The effect of the report was to accelerate the facil-
ity's evaluation by the Board pursuant to the non-criteria pollu-
tant regulations.3' Avtex sought to demonstrate that the significant
ambient air concentration ("SAAC") for CS2 was inappropriate,
since its emissions at the Front Royal plant did not endanger
human health. 2 The Board determined that Virginia's SAAC for
CS2, when adjusted for variations in averaging time, was one of the
highest allowed among those states regulating the substance, and
was therefore an appropriate standard.3
other than non-retail outlets or wholesale purchase consumer facilities, and ends on Septem-
ber 15. The purpose of the regulation is to mitigate ever increasing instances of ozone
NAAQS being exceeded.
25. 5:21 Va. Regs. Reg. 3173 (1989).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(4)(a)(ii) (1982).
27. For example, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island adopted state
implementation plans (SIP) limited RVP to nine pounds per square inch. 54 Fed. Reg.
26,030 (1989) (New York); 54 Fed. Reg. 25, 572 (1989) (New Jersey); 54 Fed. Reg. 23,650
(1989) (Connecticut and Rhode Island).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(4)(b),(c) (1982).
29. In re Avtex Fibers Front Royal, Inc. (State Air Pollution Control Bd. June 9, 1989)
(petition for appeal filed in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond on July 7, 1989).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
31. STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, REGULATIONS FOR
THE CONTROL & ABATEMENT OF AIR POLLUTION, § 120-04-0300 (1986).
32. In re Avtex Fibers Front Royal, Inc., slip. op. at 3.
33. Id. at 9.
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III. SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
A. Solid Waste
1. Legislation
The 1989 General Assembly passed legislation altering the pro-
cedure for siting solid waste management facilities. 4 Previously,
the director of the Department of Waste Management (the "De-
partment"), was required to immediately notify the governing
body of the county, city or town where any sanitary landfill or
other facility for the disposal, treatment or storage of non-hazard-
ous solid waste was to be located upon receipt of an application for
a permit to operate a facility. The appropriate governing body was
then required to notify the director within thirty days whether the
proposed facility was consistent with all local ordinances. Failure
to respond within thirty days constituted a waiver of the governing
body's objections to the issuance of a permit based on council's
local ordinances.3 5 The new legislation requires the applicant to
provide the director with certification from the appropriate gov-
erning body that the location and operation of the facility are con-
sistent with all applicable local ordinances.3 6 Upon receiving a re-
quest from an applicant, the governing body has 120 days to
inform both the applicant and the Department of the facility's
compliance or non-compliance.3 7
Virginia localities are now authorized to enact ordinances regu-
lating the siting of solid waste management facilities within their
boundaries, even if the locality has not adopted a land use ordi-
nance pursuant to Chapter 11 of Title 15.1.38 Any person desiring
to site a solid waste management facility within the boundaries of
any such locality must file its application with the governing body
of the locality. 9 Within 120 days from receipt of such application,
the governing body must grant or deny the applicant's request for
site approval. Failure of the governing body to act within this pe-
riod constitutes a grant of site approval.40 Judicial review of permit
denials is provided in the circuit court of the jurisdiction denying
34. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1408.1(B), 15.1-11.02 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
35. 1988 Va. Acts 696.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
37. Id.
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approval of a proposed site.41
The new local government facility siting approval provisions ex-
empt existing permittees as well as those who have received zoning
or other land use approval from re-submitting an application for
site approval to the appropriate locality.42 However, the new certi-
fication requirements of section 10.1-1408.1(B) of the Code of Vir-
ginia apply to all applications submitted to the Department prior
to July 1, 1989, but still pending after that date.43
The 1989 General Assembly also rewrote the section of the Vir-
ginia Waste Management Act dealing with regional solid waste
management plans." The legislation provides that Waste Manage-
ment Board ("WMB") regulations must require that local and re-
gional solid waste management plans to identify how minimum re-
cycling rates for the years 1991 to 1995 are to be achieved.4 5 After
July 1, 1992, a permit for a solid waste management facility may
not be issued until a local or regional applicant has a solid waste
management plan approved by the WMB in accordance with such
regulations.46
The General Assembly also passed legislation requiring the De-
partment to develop and implement a plan for the management
and transportation of all waste tires in Virginia.47 The cost of im-
plementing the plan, as well as the cost of any programs created by
the Department pursuant to the plan, are to be paid out of a
Waste Tire Trust Fund (the "Fund"). 4s The Fund is created by a
tire tax of fifty cents on each new tire sold by retailers within the
state.49
41. Id. § 15.1-11.02(B).
42. Id. § 15.1-11.02(C).
43. Att'y Gen. Op. at 3 (Aug. 8, 1989). This Opinion was addressed to Ms. Cynthia V.
Bailey, Executive Director of the Department of Waste Management concerning questions
of whether a facility permit application was complete under two fact situations. The Attor-
ney General concluded that the new statutory requirement for a certification from the local-
ity on its face applies to pending applications. Id.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1411 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
45. Id. The recycling rate must be 10% by 1991, 15% by 1993 and 25% by 1995. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 10.1-1422.1 (effective January 1, 1990).
48. Id. § 58.1-643 (Cum. Supp. 1989) (effective January 1, 1990).




The Department's solid waste regulations became effective on
December 21, 1988.50 These regulations establish standards and
procedures pertaining to the construction, operation, maintenance,
closure and post-closure of solid waste management facilities; iden-
tify the open dumping of solid waste and provide means to prevent
or eliminate such open dumping; and eliminate the requirements
for undertaking corrective action at solid waste management
facilities.51
The Department also published proposed regulations pertaining
to infectious waste.52 Generally, infectious wastes are (1) solid
wastes (non-exempt discarded material)5 3 which are or may have
been contaminated by pathogenic organisms 54 which are not "rou-
tinely and freely available in the community" 55 and which have a
"significant probability of being present in sufficient quantities and
with sufficient virulence to transmit disease" to humans; 56 (2) one
of several listed controlled infectious wastes,57 and (3) those mater-
ials identified as infectious waste by licensed physicians and regis-
tered nurses.58 The regulations require permits for the treatment,
storage and disposal of such waste. Facilities that are in compli-
ance with the non-permit provisions of the regulations, generate
more than seventy-five percent of all infectious waste handled on
site, do not engage in transportation or land disposal of infectious
wastes, and properly notify the Department qualify for a "permit
by rule" and need not follow the regulations' lengthy permit issu-
ance procedures.59 The regulations provide that infectious waste
50. 5:4 Va. Regs. Reg. 598 (1988).
51. Due to their length, the solid waste management regulations were not published in
the Virginia Register of Regulations, but are available for inspection at the Department of
Waste Management. The applicable provision can be found in the regulations. For a sum-
mary, see 5:4 Va. Regs. Reg. 598 (1988).
52. 5:4 Va. Regs. Reg. 506 (1988).
53. See id. at 513, § 3.3(C). Exempt materials include infectious wastes which are used
products for personal hygiene and certain absorbent material containing extremely small
amounts of blood or body fluids. Id.
54. Id. at 513, § 3.3(B)(1).
55. Id. at 513, § 3.4(A).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 513-14, § 3.5. These include quarantine wastes, cultures and stock of microorga-
nisms and biologicals, blood and blood products, pathological wastes, sharps, animal car-
casses, body parts, bedding and related wastes, residue from cleanup of a spill of infectious
waste, and any waste contaminated by or mixed with infectious waste. Id.
58. Id. at 513, § 3.4(B).
59. Id. at 514, § 4.1(B).
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management facilities must meet the financial assurance regula-
tions for solid waste facilities. The regulations also govern the
packaging, labeling, spill containment and remediation, transporta-
tion, sterilization, documentation and disposal of infectious
waste.60 Facilities which do not qualify for a permit-by-rule must
apply for a permit for the treatment, storage and disposal of such
wastes following detailed disclosure, planning and record keeping
requirements."
3. Judicial Activities
In Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp.,6' the Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed a court of appeals holding that the State
Board of Health's ("SBOH") failure to promulgate statutorily
mandated financial responsibility regulations prior to the issuance
of a permit to operate an industrial landfill did not invalidate
those permits. The decision, as a practical matter, jeopardizes the
validity of some seventy-three permits issued between October 1,
1981 and December 31, 1985.63
Former section 32.1-182 of the Code of Virginia64 required the
SBOH to promulgate financial responsibility regulations after Oc-
tober 1, 1981.65 Although the SBOH had complied with the statu-
tory deadline for providing an initial draft of the financial account-
ability regulations,6  the SBOH did not promulgate final
regulations by the time King Land Corporation applied for a land-
fill permit on December 9, 1985. After the corporation began oper-
ating the landfill, the Board of Supervisors of King & Queen
County brought suit in the local circuit court and succeeded in in-
validating the permit on the grounds that the State Health Com-
missioner was not empowered to issue permits until the financial
60. Id. at 514-17, part IV.
61. Id. at 520-31, part IX.
62. 238 Va. 97, 380 S.E.2d 895 (1989).
63. Id. at 106 n.3, 380 S.E.2d at 899 n.3 (Lacy, J., dissenting).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-182 (Repl. Vol. 1985) (repealed 1986).
65. Subsection (C) of VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-182 required the Board to make available an
initial draft of such regulations no sooner than October 1, 1980 and no later than March 1,
1981. Responsibility for administering the Commonwealth's solid and hazardous waste has
since been transferred to the Department of Waste Management. See id. §§ 10.1-1400 to -
1457 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
66. King Land Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 4 Va. App. 597, 603, 359 S.E.2d 823, 826
(1987), rev'd, 238 Va. 97, 380 S.E.2d 895 (1989).
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responsibility regulations were promulgated and complied with.17
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court and
held that the General Assembly did not intend to impose a time
limitation upon the agency for promulgation of financial responsi-
bility regulations, and that since the SBOH was expressly empow-
ered to issue permits under previous rules and regulations, the
SBOH had inherent authority to grant such permits.6 Judge Ben-
ton, dissenting, argued that section 32.1-182 of the Code of Vir-
ginia required the SBOH to promulgate such regulations within a
reasonable time, and that former section 32.1-182(A) specifically
required all solid waste landfill permits to be issued subject to the
operator's financial accountability for clean-up costs related to
abandonment.6
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted Judge Ben-
ton's view that where a public official is charged by statute to per-
form a duty, but the statute is silent as to the express time by
which the duty must be performed, there is an implied require-
ment that its mandate be fulfilled in a reasonable time.70 The ma-
jority concluded that after the earliest date upon which the State
Health Commissioner could have promulgated final regulations
passed, he lacked authority to issue any solid waste landfill permits
until "the mandated regulations were in effect and complied with
by the applicants."'1
In a strong dissent, Justice Lacy argued that neither the express
language of the statute nor its legislative history conditioned the
authority of the State Health Commissioner to issue landfill per-
mits on the adoption of financial accountability regulations. "As
logical as it might be to have the requisite financial assurances in-
corporated in the initial licensing process," Justice Lacy wrote,
"the General Assembly did not require this approach. '7 2
In a due process challenge to the Department's emergency revo-
cation of a solid waste landfill permit, a commercial landfill opera-
67. Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. at 101-02, 380 S.E.2d at 897.
68. King Land Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 4 Va. App. at 604-05, 359 S.E.2d at 826-27.
69. Id. at 609, 359 S.E.2d at 829 (Benton, J., dissenting).
70. Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. 104-05, 380 S.E.2d at 898.
71. Id. at 105, 380 S.E.2d at 898.
72. Id. at 107, 380 S.E.2d at 900 (Lacy, J., dissenting); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-249.49
(Cum. Supp. 1989). (The Virginia Pesticide Control Act expressly prohibits The Pesticide
Control Board from issuing annual pesticide business licenses until a business furnishes evi-
dence of financial responsibility).
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tor in Allegheny County obtained a federal temporary restraining
order against enforcement of the emergency revocation."3 A federal
magistrate found that the landfill operator was not afforded consti-
tutional due process, because the operator had been denied a hear-
ing, and that no provision of the Code of Virginia authorized the
procedure followed by the Department in revoking the permit.7 4
B. Hazardous Waste
1. Legislation
No significant legislation was enacted by the 1989 General As-
sembly in this area.
2. Administrative Proceedings
Virginia's authority to administer the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA") Subtitle C Hazardous Waste Pro-
gram 75 is conditioned upon continuous updating of state regula-
tions to insure hazardous waste management standards are at least
as stringent as federal requirements.7 6 Accordingly, the Waste
Management Board adopted Amendment Nine to its Hazardous
Waste Management Regulations, which essentially parallels the
EPA's amendments to the RCRA list of hazardous wastes.77 In or-
der to insure proper handling of solid wastes which are not regu-
lated as hazardous wastes under either federal or Virginia regula-
tions, but are regulated as hazardous by the generator's state,
Amendment Nine adds a new rule making provision.7 8 The provi-
sion allows a generator of such substances to petition the Depart-
ment of Waste Management for an exclusion from a determination
of hazardous characteristics in order to manage the solid wastes
within Virginia.79
The Board also adopted Amendment Seven to its Regulations
Governing the Transportation of Hazardous Materials. Amend-
73. Kim Stan, Inc. v. Department of Waste Management, No. 89-00373-R (E.D. Va. June
19, 1989).
74. Id. at 2. The operator was required to post daily security in the amount of $2,500 to
protect the Department against the costs of surface water remediation during the effective
period of the restraining order.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982 and Supp. III 1986).
76. Id. § 6929.





ment Seven incorporates by reference changes made by the United
States Department of Transportation in Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations from January 1, 1982, to June 30, 1988.80
3. Judicial Activities
In United States v. Monsanto Co.,," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit joined a number of other federal
courts in holding that the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") s2 constitu-
tionally imposes retroactive joint and several liability for govern-
mental response costs where a release or threat of release of
hazardous substances results in indivisible environmental harm.83
In Monsanto, the land owners leased a four-acre tract, pursuant to
an oral month-to-month lease, to a private chemical waste han-
dler.s4 The site subsequently became the target of federal RCRA
injunctive action.8 5 During discovery, by which time the state of
South Carolina had intervened as a plaintiff, the federal govern-
ment identified a number of additional waste generators who had
contracted with the private chemical waste handler for waste dis-
posal. Many of these parties settled. 6 Two years after the passage
of CERCLA, the government plaintiffs amended their RCRA com-
plaint to add three non-settling generator defendants and one of
the two site owners under section 9607(a). 7
On cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of the de-
fendants' CERCLA liability for governmental response costs, the
district court held that the government was not required to prove
that the specific substances the waste generators created and sent
to the site were present at the facility at the time of the release or
threatened release which triggered the government response.88 The
80. 5:14 Va. Regs. Reg. 1837-38 (1989). A summary of this amendment is available in the
Virginia Register of Regulations. Id. However, because the amendment incorporates by ref-
erence 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-179, 390-397 it is not reprinted in the Register. Copies are available
at the Department of Waste Management and in the office of the Registrar of Regulations.
Id.
81. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
83. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173-74.
84. Id. at 164. According to the owner's deposition, the sole purpose of the lease was to
allow the lessee to store raw materials and finished product in the warehouse. Id. at 165.
85. Id. This was filed before the effective date of CERCLA. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 992-93
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Fourth Circuit affirmed, stating that where there is no proof that a
generator defendant's specific waste was present in a facility at the
time of release, a showing of a chemical similarity between the haz-
ardous substances discovered on site and the generator defendant's
waste is sufficient to impose liability. 9 The court noted that the
generator defendants presented no evidence showing a relationship
between the waste volume, the release of hazardous substances,
and the harm at the site.90 Finally, the court, over a vigorous dis-
sent by Judge Widener,91 affirmed the trial court's refusal to treat
the issue of allocation of clean-up costs among the various defend-
ants during the government's cost recovery action.92 The Fourth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration
of its denial of prejudgment interest to the government. 93
In United States v. Dart Industries, Inc.,94 the Fourth Circuit
held that the South Carolina Department of Health and Environ-
mental Control (DHEC) was not a responsible party under CER-
CLA as an owner or operator of a hazardous waste facility.9 5 Sev-
eral generator defendants, in a government cost recovery action,
alleged that the DHEC controlled the activities of a hazardous
waste site prior to its abandonment by its last owner. The DHEC
approved or disapproved applications to store waste at the site and
regulated transportation of waste to the site. The generator de-
fendants argued that DHEC caused or contributed to hazardous
waste being released at the site following bankruptcy of one of the
generators. The court held that even though a state agency may
have inadequately enforced state regulations, such deficiencies
alone do not constitute ownership or control as defined in the
Act.96
(D.S.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
89. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 169.
90. Id. at 172.
91. Id. at 176-77 (Widener, J., dissenting).
92. The generator defendant's subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court on this issue was denied. See Light, United States v. Monsanto, In-
consistency in the Government's Position on the Timing of CERCLA Contribution Claims,
19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10163 (1989).
93. The district court's decision on this point was made prior to the passage of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, which expressly authorize such
awards. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 10, 15, 26, 29, 33 and 42 U.S.C.).
94. 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988).




In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Milliken & Co.,97 the Fourth Cir-
cuit again held that a comprehensive general liability ("CGL") in-
surer is not obligated to reimburse its insured for government re-
sponse or remediation costs incurred under section 9607(a)(1)-
(4) (A) of CERCLA,9 8 pursuant to the standard CGL property dam-
age use."9 The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the unconditional aban-
donment by a trustee in bankruptcy of property where violations
of state environmental laws existed, but did not pose a serious risk
to public health and safety.100 The facility, a former fertilizer plant
located in the state of Illinois, along with two creditors opposed
the trustee's unconditional abandonment. They further argued
that the debtor should be required to remediate the environmental
hazards, which included hazardous waste violations. The bank-
ruptcy court concluded that there was no imminent harm or dan-
ger to the public, and since the debtor had no unencumbered as-
sets, the court authorized abandonment pursuant to section 554(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code.' 0' The district court affirmed, but held
that consideration of the debtor's financial condition was irrele-
vant.'02 Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed, the court stated that
where an estate has unencumbered assets, "stricter compliance"
with state environmental laws should be required prior to
abandonment. 0 3
Federal district courts in Virginia had occasion to determine
procedural matters in CERCLA litigation. In United States v.
Moore,04 the court held that the SARA statute of limitations0 5
did not apply retroactively to actions for response costs incurred
97. 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
99. Milliken, 857 F.2d at 980-81 (following Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822
F.2d. 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) and Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d. 1325 (4th Cir.
1986)). Both Maryland and Mraz were decided under Maryland law, while in Milliken, the
court applied the law of South Carolina to construe the term "damages" in the insurance
context to mean legal damages; not CERCLA response costs. See Hapke, Federal Circuit
Court Insurance Decisions Contaminate Superfund Policy, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10393, 10398 n.53 (1989).
100. Smith-Douglass, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit, 856 F.2d 12, 16-17 (4th Cir.
1988).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982).
102. In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 75 Bankr. 994, 998 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
103. Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d. at 17. The court cautioned that it was not making a de-
termination of liability for cleanup costs, but also acknowledged that, as a practical matter,
the state's likelihood of bearing at least some cost was increased by the decision. Id. at 15
n.4.
104. 18 Envt'l. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21272 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 1988).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
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prior to October 17, 1986. The court also held that a dissolved Vir-
ginia corporation may be sued under CERCLA for acts committed
prior to its dissolution.""6 Finally, in a private cost recovery action
under CERCLA, the district court held that failure to allege a re-
lease or threatened release of a hazardous substance is jurisdiction-
ally defective. 10 7
IV. WATER
A. Legislation
The 1989 General Assembly enacted significant new legislation
dealing with water resource conservation and authorizing the State
Water Control Board ("SWCB") to initiate surface water manage-
ment proceedings. 08 If, after a public hearing, the SWCB finds
that:
(1) A stream has substantial instream values as indicated by evi-
dence of fishery, recreation, habitat, cultural or aesthetic properties;
and (2) Historical records or current conditions indicate that a low
flow condition could occur which would threaten important instream
uses; and (3) Current or potential offstream uses contribute to or are
likely to exacerbate natural low flow conditions to the detriment of
instream values109
and it is in the interest of the public welfare to do so, then the
SWCB must declare the area in question a "surface water manage-
ment area."" 0 Once the resource has been so designated, water
cannot be drawn without a SWCB-issued surface water withdrawal
permit."' Such permits must set flow requirements appropriate for
the protection of beneficial instream users. 12
Existing beneficial consumptive users are not required to obtain
a service water withdrawal permit for any withdrawal in existence
on July 1, 1989; however, a permit is required in declared surface
water management areas before increasing daily consumption be-
106. Moore, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21272.
107. Bryant v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 699 F. Supp. 546, 547 (W.D. Va. 1987).
108. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to -253 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
109. Id. § 62.1-246(1)-(3).
110. Id. § 62.1-246 (B).
111. See id. § 62.1-243.
112. Id. § 62.1-248 (A).
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yond the maximum daily withdrawal made before July 1, 1989.11
In order to qualify for the exemption from the permitting require-
ments, the beneficial consumptive user must institute a water
management program approved by the SWCB." 4 Certificates of
Exemption which include the conservation or management pro-
grams as conditions will then be issued to the user. 5
The new legislation provides for daily penalties of up to $1,000
each for violation of the surface water management area provi-
sions. 1 6 Further, the new provisions are not to be construed as al-
tering, or authorizing any alteration of, any existing riparian rights,
except as set forth in the new permits. The conditions in the per-
mits will be enforced only when low stream flows, or the potential
thereof, result in a SWCB declaration of a surface water manage-
ment area."1
In related legislation, the General Assembly rewrote the defini-
tion of "beneficial use" in section 62.1-10(b)" 8 of the Code of Vir-
ginia to conform with that in new section 62.1-242,"11 except that
public water supply uses for human consumption are designated as
the highest priority.120 The General Assembly declared that the
quality of state waters is affected by the quantity of water and that
the intent of the Commonwealth is to maintain flow conditions to
protect instream beneficial uses in public water supplies for human
consumption.' 21 The SWCB has the authority and standing to in-
tervene as an interested party in any civil action, both in and
outside the Commonwealth, pertaining to the withdrawal of any of
113. Id. § 62.1-243(C)(1).
114. Id. § 62.1-243(C)(2). This water management program will include: (i) use of water-
saving plumbing; (ii) a water loss reduction program; (iii) a water use education program;
and (iv) mandatory reductions during water shortage emergencies. Id.
115. Id. § 62.1-243(D).
116. Id. § 62.1-252(A).
117. Id. § 62.1-253.
118. Id. § 62.1-10(b).
119. Id. § 62.1-242 (definitions of the Surface Water Management Areas).
120. Id. § 62.1-10(b). This term means:
both instream and offstream uses. Instream beneficial uses include, but are not lim-
ited to the protection of fish and wild life habitat, maintenance of waste assimilation,
recreation, navigation and cultural and aesthetic values. Offstream beneficial uses in-
clude, but are not limited to, domestic (including public water supply), agricultural,
electric power generation, commercial and industrial uses. Public water supply uses
for consumption shall be considered the highest priority.
Id.
121. Id. § 62.1-11(F).
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the surface waters of the Commonwealth.1 22
In legislation affecting underground storage tanks, the 1989 Gen-
eral Assembly expanded the definition of "person" to include a
trust, firm, joint stock company, government corporation, or politi-
cal subdivision of a state. 23 The SWCB may seek recovery of costs
incurred for corrective or enforcement action, taken in response to
the release of regulated substances from underground storage
tanks,124 except where such costs were expended from the Virginia
Underground Petroleum Storage Tank Fund. 25 The General As-
sembly rewrote the financial responsibility provisions of Article 10.
Owners, operators, and petroleum storage tank vendors are now re-
quired to maintain evidence of financial responsibility in an
amount of not less than $150,000 per occurrence for compensating
third parties for bodily injury and property damage. 2 '
The 1989 General Assembly also passed legislation clarifying the
type of hearing to be held in connection with the triennial review
of water quality standards.127 The amended legislation generally
requires that public hearings to be held pursuant to the Virginia
Administrative Process Act's ("VAPA") 128 informal hearing guide-
lines.129 Moreover, upon the request of an affected person or upon
its own motion, the SWCB must hold formal evidential hearings
pursuant to section 9-6.14:8 of VAPA.130
B. Administrative Proceedings
The SWCB adopted revisions to the Virginia Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System and Virginia Pollutant Abatement Per-
mit Program' 31 effective June 21, 1989, which conformed to the
changes in the Federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
122. Id. § 62.1-44.23:1.
123. Id. §§ 62.1-44.34:8, :10.
124. Id. § 62.1-44.34:9(10).
125. Id. (moneys expended from the Virginia Underground Petroleum Storage Tank
Fund are governed by Id. § 62.1-44.34:11).
126. Id. § 62.1-44.34:12(A).
127. Id. § 62.1-44.15(3a).
128. Id. § 9-6.14:1 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
129. Id. § 9-6.14:7.1(B). This section states, "In formulating any regulation, including but
not limited to those in public assistance programs, the agency pursuant to its public partici-
pation guidelines shall afford interested persons an opportunity to submit data, views, and
arguments, either orally or in writing, to the agency or its specially designated subordinate."
Id.
130. Id. § 62.1-44.15(3a).
131. 5:14 Va. Regs. Reg. 1779 (1989).
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System (NPDES) Program. 132 The SWCB issued its final technical
standards and corrective action requirements for underground
storage tanks which became effective on October 25, 1989.1' Vir-
ginia limits the federal exemption for tanks storing heating oil for
consumption for use on the premises to those tanks having a ca-
pacity of less than 5,000 gallons. 34 The proposed regulations in-
sure that inspection and upgrading will be done in accordance with
Virginia building codes. 35 The regulations otherwise track the fed-
eral technical requirements promulgated last year.' Finally, the
SWCB issued proposed Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fi-
nancial Requirements which, for the most part, track the federal
regulations. 37
On August 14, 1989, the SWCB published final water quality
standards applicable to chlorine and the designation of certain
state waters as outstanding resource waters.'38 An earlier form of
the final regulations had been previously adopted by the SWCB on
September 27, 1988, as emergency regulations following the invali-
dation of the original regulations by the Circuit Court of the City
of Roanoke. 39 The new regulations, like the emergency regulations
and the vacated original regulations before them, establish a state-
wide chlorine restriction standard and prohibit or restrict the use
of chlorine or other halogen compounds' 4 ° for disinfection where
the treatment facility discharges permitted flows exceeding 20,000
gallons per day into waters containing 4ndangered or threatened
species, or natural trout waters.' 4 ' The regulation further
designates a number of water resources as scenic rivers, thus sub-
jecting them to the state's antidegradation policy.' 42 The SWCB
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
133. 5:14 Va. Regs. Reg. 4103 (1989).
134. Id. at 4106.
135. Id. at 4107.
136. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,082 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 280).
137. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,322 (1988).
138. 5:23 Va. Regs. Reg. 3535 (1989).
139. Appalachian Power Co. v. State Water Control Bd., No. CH87-000733 (Roanoke Aug.
17, 1988). The emergency regulations are the subject of a current petition for appeal. Appa-
lachian Power Co. v. State Water Control Bd., No. CH88-000698W (Roanoke Oct. 27, 1988).
140. Other halogen compounds include bromine, bromine chloride, hypochloride and
chlorine dioxide. 5:23 Va. Regs. Reg. 3536.
141. Id. at 3536.
142. Id. at 3536-37. In addition, portions of the Clinch, Powell, North Fork, Holston and
Middle Fork Holston Rivers and Copper Creek in Southwestern Virginia were designated as
critical habitat for nine endangered species of freshwater mussel and for three threatened
species of fish.
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published proposed regulations expanding the existing ground
water management area in Southeastern Virginia. 143 The SWCB
also published proposed amendments to its water quality stan-
dards relating to surface water,14 4 stream flow' 45 and mercury in
fresh water.146
C. Judicial Activities
In Champion International Corp. v. EPA,47 the Fourth Circuit
held that judicial review of the EPA's objections to a state pro-
posed NPDES permit was premature, since such objections consti-
tuted neither a grant nor a denial of an NPDES permit.
48
In National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson,49 the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that since the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") has a
non-discretionary duty to regulate dredged or fill material under
the Clean Water Act (CWA), a citizen's suit against the EPA for
failure to adequately protect wetlands may properly join the Corps
as a party for its failure to make a reasonable wetlands determina-
tion. In addressing the issue of awarding attorneys' fees, the court
distinguished environmental litigation from traditional civil cases,
and added that it was important to interpret the term "prevail-
ing" 150 in a manner consistent with the goals of the CWA in deter-
mining whether or not a party is entitled to attorneys' fees.' 5' Be-
cause the plaintiff successfully demonstrated that the Corps had
not undertaken the necessary investigations in making the wet-
lands determination, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to an award of attorneys' fees regarding the ultimate wetland
determination.'52
143. 5:21 Va. Regs. Reg. 3023 (1989).
144. -Id. at 3024-25.
145. Id. at 3025.
146. Id. at 3025-26.
147. 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988).
148. Id. at 190.
149. 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, No. 82-3183 (4th Cir. Dec. 14, 1988).
150. Section 505(d) of the Clean Water Act provides, "The court in issuing any final order
in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (including rea-
sonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 317. Though the action was heard in Raleigh, the court's award of attorneys'




A company seeking certification under the CWA in Virginia
must file a formal application with the SWCB. 15 3 In Fredericks-
burg v. FERC,154 a hydroelectric company failed to submit a joint
permit application provided by the SWCB in response to the com-
pany's letter requesting section 401(c)(1) certification. 5 5 The court
held that the company's failure to submit this application did not
constitute a request for certification within the meaning of FERC
regulations, and therefore FERC improperly waived the CWA cer-
tification requirements." 6
In Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States,'57 a developer sought a
section 404 permit in order to fill a wetland for development pur-
poses. The developer subsequently withdrew its permit application
and filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a judicial determi-
nation that the property did not fall within the Corps' jurisdic-
tion.158 The Corps asserted jurisdiction over the property on the
ground that it was an isolated water area which was used or could
be used as habitat by migratory birds crossing state lines. The de-
termination was based on an initial Corps memorandum that listed
seven standards, which indicated that a sufficient nexus to inter-
state commerce existed to warrant Corps jurisdiction over isolated
waters pursuant to section 404 implementing regulations.' 59 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
determined that the memorandum did not fall within the interpre-
tive exemption to the notice and comment provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. 60 Instead, the court determined the
memorandum affected a change in Corps' policy which was in-
tended to have the full force and effect of a substantive rule and
which allowed no discretion in making jurisdictional
determinations.' 6 '
On March 27, 1989, the Court of Appeals of Virginia heard oral
argument in Appalachian Power Co. v. Commonwealth.162 The ap-
peal resulted from the trial court's invalidation of the SWCB's
153. See Fredericksburg v. FERC, 876 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1989).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1111.
156. Id. at 1111-12.
157. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20672 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 1988).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1982).
161. Tabb Lakes, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20673.
162. Appalachian Power Co. v. Commonwealth, No. CH 87-000733 (Roanoke Aug. 17,
1988).
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chlorine water quality standard and new designation of outstand-
ing resource waters.163 The issue argued on appeal was whether for-
mer section 62.1-44.15(3a) of the Code of Virginia,' in effect when
the regulations were adopted in the last part of the 1987 triennial
water quality standard review, required an evidential hearing.
V. PESTICIDES
A. Legislation
The 1989 Virginia General Assembly passed legislation amend-
ing the Virginia Pesticide Law by creating the Virginia Pesticide
Control Act. 65 Central to the Act, is the creation of an eleven
member Pesticide Control Board, 6 6 which is empowered to pro-
mulgate regulations related to the licensing of pesticide applica-
tors, registration of pesticides, record keeping, equipment relating
to licensing and registration, establishing certification training and
testing standards for applicators and technicians, as well as a num-
ber of other duties.'6 7 The Commissioner of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Services maintains his registration authority, as well as his
authority to receive, concurrent with the Pesticide Control Board,
citizen complaints relating to the sale, use, handling or disposal of
any pesticide. 168 A special fund is designated by the new statute in
which fees and penalties collected are to be deposited and used to
carry out the provisions of the chapter. 69 Virtually all provisions
of the former Virginia Pesticide Law pertaining to registration
have been carried forward except for the provisions relating to ex-
piration of registration. 7 ' The new act also requires a business li-
cense to be issued upon payment of a Board established fee prior
to any sale, distribution or storage of any pesticide in Virginia.'7 '
Retailers of limited quantities of non-restricted use pesticides in-
cluding grocery stores, convenience stores, drug stores, veterinari-
ans, and businesses who sell pesticides primarily for limited house-
hold use, are to be exempt from the annual business license
163. Id.
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(3a) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
165. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.1-249.27 to -249.78 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
166. Id. § 3.1-249.28.
167. Id. § 3.1-249.29.
168. Id. §§ 3.1-249.32 to -249.45.
169. Id. § 3.1-249.34.
170. Id. § 3.1-223 (Rep. Vol. 1983).
171. Id. § 3.1-249.46 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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requirement pursuant to regulations that will be promulgated by
the Pesticide Control Board. 17 2 Such licenses are expressly condi-
tioned upon evidence of financial responsibility173 which, under the
former act, was only required of holders of commercial applicators
licenses. Provisions relating to pesticide application and certifica-
tion, and to marine anti-foulent paints, have been carried for-
ward. 174 The act contains a trade secret provision based largely on
relevant provisions in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodentricide Act ("FIFRA").
Penalties attendant upon violations of the pesticide laws have
been significantly increased. Any knowing violation of the act or its
regulations constitutes a class 1 misdemeanor with an additional
fine of up to $500,000 if death or serious physical harm to any per-
son is caused by the violation. 176 Other violations are classified as
"less than serious" ($1,000 fine) 177 to "serious" ($5,000 fine)'7 8 and
a "repeat" or "knowing" ($20,000 fine).179 Up to $100,000 may be
added to any violation which causes serious damage to the environ-
ment, serious injury to property, or serious injury to or death of
any person.'80 Prior to the 1989 legislation, persons convicted of
violating any provisions of the Virginia Pesticide Law or its regula-
tions were punished at the discretion of the court, and violations of
commercial application, certification and restricted use prohibi-
tions, resulted only in a class 2 misdemeanor.' 8 '
B. Administrative Proceedings
Until repealed by the Pesticide Control Board, the Department
of Agriculture and Consumer Services' Rules and Regulations for
Enforcement of the Virginia Pesticide Law'8 2 remain in effect.183
172. Id.
173. Id. § 3.1-249.49.
174. Id. §§ 3.1-249.51 to -249.62.
175. 7 U.S.C. § 136(h) (1982).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-249.70(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989). Class 1 misdemeanors are punish-
able by confinement in jail for not more than a year and a fine of not more than $1,000,
either or both. Id. § 18.2-11 (Repl. Vol. 1988).




181. Class 2 misdemeanors may result in a jail term of up to six months and a fine of up
to $500. Id. § 18.2-11 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
182. 2:2 Va. Regs. Reg. 1504 (1986).
183. See VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-249.30 (Cum. Supp. 1989) (editor's note).
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C. Judicial Activities
In United States v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 84 the court de-
cided whether the delegation of primary enforcement authority to
the states under the FIFRA divests the U.S. Attorney General of
his enforcement authority. In Orkin, employees of Orkin used the
Pesticide Vikane to exterminate the home of a Galax, Virginia
couple. The couple later died of Vikane poisoning. 85 The Com-
monwealth's Attorney for Grayson County, Virginia, brought a
three count indictment against pesticide applicators, including two
counts of involuntary manslaughter and one count of misapplica-
tion of pesticide. The Grayson County Circuit Court subsequently
dismissed the involuntary manslaughter indictments on the
grounds that corporations could not be convicted of those
charges. 86 The Commonwealth's Attorney chose to nolle prosequi
the remaining criminal charges and turned the matter over to the
U.S. Attorney's office. When a federal grand jury returned a five
count criminal indictment against Orkin, Orkin challenged the At-
torney General's power to enforce FIFRA.187 Orkin argued that
primary enforcement authority had been delegated to Virginia and
that the state had initiated an "appropriate enforcement action"
which precluded federal action. 88 The court rejected Orkin's argu-
ment and reasoned that "primary" enforcement authority was not
the same as "exclusive" enforcement authority and that the Attor-
ney General, therefore, had plenary enforcement powers.18 9
184. 688 F. Supp. 223 (W.D. Va. 1988).
185. Id. at 223.
186. Id. at 224.
187. Id.
188. See 7 U.S.C. § 136w-2 (1982).
189. Orkin, 688 F.Supp. at 225.
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